Evidence:
A Logical Approach
Three
types of evidentiary claim – hearsay rule illustration A logocratic scheme for analyzing every
single evidence claim in a case calling
for application of a rule of evidence
Note:
"hn" is an element in a claim, charge, or
defense -- i.e., a "material" element. Every case
specifies a set of hn -- hn-1, hn-2,
hn-3, etc. This question actually
consists of two component questions. Using our
- h schema, we can represent these two questions as follows
(1)
What logical element(s) is (are) required to satisfy the rule? --
label the element "hn" (or "hn-1,
hn-2, hn-3 . . .") (2)
What decisionmaker, judge or jury, decides whether the evidence available establishes logical element? -- label that evidence "n " to correspond to hn (or "n-1
, n-2 ,
n-3 . . .") Note that for many of
the FRE [Federal Rules of Evidence], there are many pairs of
n / hn:
n-1 / hn-1,
n-2 / hn-2.
For example, for [Federal Rule of Evidence] 801(a)-(c), there are
hn-1
there is a statement hn-2
the statement was made by a declarant hn-3
the statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted For each element hn-1,
hn-2, and hn-3, there will be evidence used to
establish it, n-1,
n-2 , and n-3,
and some decisionmaker must decide whether the evidence supports the
element. In this case, we know from FRE 104 that the judge is to
decide whether the logical elements hn-1, hn-2,
and hn-3 are all satisfied. If she decides that they are
all satisfied, then she must further decide whether the logical
elements of some exemption or exception are also satisfied. There must be some
evidence, in our schema we'd label it "n-1"
that a decisionmaker uses to establish hn-1. If the law
of the jurisdiction treats the question whether hn-1 is
established as a question of conditional relevance,
then the jury is given the question whether whatever n-1
is available establishes hn-1. (Only, of course, if
the judge first decides that whatever n-1
is available is sufficient for a reasonable jury,
operating according to the appropriate burden of persuasion, to find
that n-1 establishes
hn-1).
Non-law-related evidentiary claim
This might be a
slightly misleading term, but it's intended to describe evidentiary
claims that are made outside the formal confines of trial procedures.
Obviously such claims occur in a vast range of settings, some on
jobs, others in "everyday life." Here are some examples of
non-law-related evidentiary claims that come up with a Google search
of the phrase "evidence does not support": "But the evidence does not supporta correlation between serum vitamin B(12) or folate and cognitive
impairment in people aged over 60 years." "The
Available Evidence Does Not
Support Fossil Fuels as the Source of Increasing
Concentrations of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide." "Vaccines
and Autism: Evidence Does Not Support a Causal Association." Obviously any setting
for a non-law-related evidentiary claim could become associated with
litigation, and in that way could somehow figure in a
substantive-law-related evidentiary claim or in an
adjective-law-related evidentiary claim (these terms are explained
below). Note that, despite not being made within the confines of
formal litigation, non-law-related evidentiary claims are extremely
important for evidence law. That's because these are the kinds
claims on which judges and juries rely pervasively when they deploy
the "every day common sense" that underwrites the inductive
inferences they make when they are involved as decisionmakers in
formal litigation. Substantive-law-related evidentiary claim
The phrase "substantive
law" refers to the body of rules that determine the rights and
obligations of individuals and collective bodies in all categories of
public and private law, including contracts, property, torts, and
criminal law. "Substantive-law-related evidentiary claims"
are claims about the evidence that supports the hypotheses that are
specified by rules of substantive law as logical elements of claims,
charges, or defenses. Here's an example from the substantive law of
contracts -- the rule for promissory estoppel: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." hn-1
There is a promise. hn-2
The promise is one for which the promisor should reasonably expect
to
induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person hn-3
The promise does induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee
or
a third person on the part of the promisee or a third person. hn-4 Injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. hn-5 The
promise is binding. Logical form of this rule:
If
(hn-1 & hn-2 & hn-3 &
hn-4) then hn-5 For each of
these logical elements hn-1, hn-2, hn-3,
and hn-4, substantive contract law requires that there be
some evidence that is adequate to support the conclusion that
the element is satisfied -- evidence that we can label, in our
scheme, "n-1,"
"n-2,"
n-3" and
"n-4,"
respectively. That is, in contracts litigation, a plaintiff who
wanted to claim that there was a binding promise under this rule
(i.e., that what is labeled above as "hn-5" is
true on the facts of the case) would have to provide evidence that
each element in the rule is satisfied. So for example, evidence for
hn-1 in a given case might be testimony. hn-1 The
plaintiff testified that the defendant promised to pay for her son's
medical
treatment could
be offered to prove
hn-1 There
was a promise by the defendant to pay for the plaintiff's son's
medical treatment.1 Interesting question:
What kind of evidence might the plaintiff proffer to prove the
element labeled "hn-4"? With delightful
understatement, a state appellate court that has adopted the version
of the promissory estoppel rule quoted above notes that this element
of the rule "is not cast with precision." Midwest
Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2000). That vagueness creates an interesting question
regarding how a litigant is to go about providing evidence to prove
it! The phrase "adjective
law" is a somewhat archaic but useful phrase that refers to
those rules of law that govern evidence, pleading, and procedure.
The analogy is to grammar: adjectives modify "substantives"
(like nouns and pronouns), and adjective law "modifies"
(or, better way to put it, facilitates) substantive laws. It can be
very analytically clarifying to note that the application of rules of
evidence itself calls for a wide variety of evidentiary claims that
are distinct from substantive-law-related evidentiary claims. It is
to this type of evidentiary claim that I intend to refer with the
phrase "adjective-law-related evidentiary claim."
Adjective-law-related evidentiary claims are claims about the
evidence that supports those hypotheses that are specified as logical
elements by a rule of evidence law or a rule of pleading or
procedure. Here's an example from the evidence law -- the rule
defining hearsay in FRE 801: Rule 801.
Definitions . . .The following definitions apply under this article: (a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion. (b) Declarant. A
"declarant" is a person who makes a statement. (c)
Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. hn-1
There is a statement. hn-2
The statement was made by a declarant not while testifying at
the trial or
hearing. hn-3
The statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted. hn-4
The statement is hearsay. Logical form of this rule:
If
(hn-1 & hn-2 & hn-3) then
hn-4 Evidentiary requirements of this rule:
Note that for many of
the FRE there are several pairs of n/hn:
n-1/hn-1,
n-2/hn-2,
because the rules often specify more than one logical element that
must be satisfied in order to satisfy the rule. Thus, in the example
above of 801(a)-(c), there are three logical elements, hn-1,
hn-2, and hn-3 (which are called "jointly
sufficient conditions") such that, when all three are true, hn-4
is true as well. For each element hn-1,
hn-2, and hn-3, there will be evidence used to
establish it, which we can label "n-1,"
"n-2,"
and "n-3,"
respectively, and some decisionmaker must decide whether the evidence
supports the element (hypothesis) for which the evidence is offered.
In this case, we know from FRE 104 that the judge is to decide
whether the logical elements in FRE 801, hn-1, hn-2,
and hn-3, are all satisfied. If she decides that they are
all satisfied, then she must further decide whether the logical
elements of some exemption or exception are also satisfied. Note
that substantive-law-related evidentiary claims are also claims about
pairs of n / hn:
n-1 / hn-1,
n-2 / hn-2
. . . . The difference is that those claims are made to
satisfy the logical elements of rules of substantive laws, whereas
adjective-law-related evidentiary claims are made to satisfy the
logical elements of rules of evidence and procedure. Notes on adjective-law-related
evidentiary claims and substantive-law-related
evidentiary claims
(1) There are three questions the evidence
analyst should always be able to answer when applying a rule of
evidence to a fact pattern (that is, when making or evaluating an
adjective-law-related evidentiary claim): (i)
What are the pairs of n
/ hn (the logical elements of the rule) specified by the
rule in question? (ii)
Who decides whether the given n
establishes the hn , judge or jury? (iii)
Under what standard of proof does the decisionmaking identified in
(ii) make the decision? 1 Note that several distinct types or "pieces" of evidence
could in principle be offered for a single hypothesis -- testimony,
documentary evidence, etc. So, in our scheme, for hn-1 a
proponent could offer n-1a
and n-1b
, etc. It would be up to a trial judge under 403 to decide whether
several such pieces of evidence offered for the same hypothesis were
needlessly cumulative, time wasting, etc.
©
Professor Scott Brewer
Harvard
Law School
Evidentiary requirements of this rule:
Adjective-law-related evidentiary claim