State v. Lynch

Suttell, Justice. The defendant, Raymond Lynch, appeals from Superior Court jury convictions of three counts of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of second-degree sexual assault. The victim of all five assaults was his developmentally impaired daughter Mary. n1 He alleges that the trial court committed thirteen distinct errors that warrant reversal of some or all the convictions, and that the trial justice abused his discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

n1 The names of the victim and all juveniles mentioned in this opinion are fictitious.

Facts and Travel

At the time of the precipitating incident, Mary was sixteen years old and resided in Warwick, Rhode Island, with her parents, her younger sister, and younger brother. On Friday, September 20, 1996, Mary invited a friend from school, Michelle, to sleep over at her house. The girls watched a movie together in Mary's bed, and then fell asleep.

Michelle testified at trial that she woke up to find defendant leaning over her and rubbing the upper part of the back of her thigh. She further testified that defendant told her, "If you need a place to sleep, you can come sleep with me." Michelle immediately left the Lynch household and walked home. Michelle was described as "hysterical" when she arrived home. The police were called, and responded to her home with a rape crisis counselor.

On September 24, 1996, the next school day, Michelle met with Mary-Ellen Tillotson, a school psychologist. Michelle testified that she did so because she was concerned that defendant might be abusing Mary. Thereafter, Ms. Tillotson called Mary to her office. Ms. Tillotson testified that Mary initially said that she was not supposed to talk about what her father did to her when her mother was at work. Mary then said that defendant had sex with her "all the time" in the basement of their home. Ms. Tillotson immediately called the Warwick Police Department and the Department of Children, Youth, and Families and later drove Mary and Michelle to the police station.

The defendant was arrested that day. Several weeks later an indictment was filed charging him with three counts of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of second-degree sexual assault against Mary, one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of simple assault against her younger sister, and one count of simple assault against Michelle. A jury convicted him of the five counts involving Mary, n2 after which defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on May 8, 1998. The trial justice sentenced defendant to sixty years, thirty to serve, on each of the first-degree sexual assault convictions, and ten years to serve on the two second-degree sexual assault convictions, all the sentences to run concurrently. Other facts will be supplied as needed to address the issues on appeal.

n2 The defendant was acquitted on the other three counts.

Mary's Competency

The defendant alleges that the trial justice abused his discretion in finding Mary competent to testify in light of her cognitive and communicative limitations, impairment of intellectual abilities, and the conflicting testimony at her competency hearing.

Rule 601 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence requires that a witness be competent to testify. The trial court must make four determinations in evaluating a witness's competency: the witness must be able to "observe, recollect, communicate, and appreciate the necessity of telling the truth." Seabra v. Trafford-Seabra, 655 A.2d 250, 252 (R.I. 1995) (citing State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 629, 410 A.2d 438, 442 (1980)). This Court will overturn a competency decision only for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1098-99 (R.I. 1991)). "The trial justice is afforded considerable deference in making a competency ruling since he is in the best position to assess the witness's present ability to comprehend the obligation of this oath, and to give a correct account of what he may have seen or heard." Id. (citing State v. Franklin, 103 R.I. 715, 724, 241 A.2d 219, 225 (1968)). In the case at hand, the trial justice conducted a voir dire of Mary, and was sufficiently satisfied that she had the ability to observe, recollect, and communicate, and that she appreciated the necessity of telling the truth. We agree.

Mary's testimony demonstrated her ability to observe. She testified that at the time of trial she lived with two housemates, and that they had their own rooms. She testified that she had a television in her room and a computer that didn't work because it was not connected. Additionally, she testified about the details concerning the multiple times that defendant sexually assaulted her.

Mary's testimony of the sexual assaults demonstrates that she had the ability to remember. The defendant notes, however, that Mary did not know what day her favorite television programs were on or whether she had any books in her room. It was recognized at the trial that Mary does have cognitive limitations. A sexual assault, however, is a traumatic event and thus may be more clearly memorable than other everyday normal occurrences. See State v. Girouard, 561 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 1989). It is reasonable to believe that even though Mary may not have a clear recollection of the exact times and places that the alleged multiple assaults took place, she is still cognizant of the fact that the assaults occurred.

Mary demonstrated an ability to communicate by relating facts of the sexual assaults, pointing to her body parts when asked, and identifying defendant in the courtroom. This level of communication meets the requirements for competency to testify before the court. See id. (ability to communicate adequately demonstrated by witness relating the facts of the crime, pointing to body parts on a diagram, and identifying defendant in the courtroom). Although defendant noted that Mary could not adequately communicate whether she was going to graduate from high school that year, or what grade she currently was in, we conclude that her overall responses indicated her capacity to understand questions and to furnish intelligent answers.

The transcripts also evidence Mary's knowledge of the necessity of telling the truth.

"THE COURT: And, if he asks you a question, what are you supposed to do?

"THE WITNESS: I'm supposed to talk in here.

"THE COURT: And, what are you supposed to tell us?

"THE WITNESS: Everything.

"* * *

"THE COURT: All right. Now are you going to tell us any lies?

"THE [*7] WITNESS: No.

"THE COURT: Why not?

"THE WITNESS: Because its [sic] very important to tell the truth."

"A child need not articulate magic words that he or she knows the difference between a lie and a truth as long as the child understands the definitions of both and was there to tell the truth." Girouard, 561 A.2d at 886 (citing In re Gerald, 471 A.2d 219, 220-21 (R.I. 1984)). We defer to the judgment of the trial justice, who upon hearing this exchange, was confident that Mary in fact did understand the difference between the truth and a lie.

After reviewing the four testimonial capacities required for a finding of competency, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in finding Mary competent to testify. Though she suffered from cognitive and communicative limitations, she met the standard of competency set forth by this Court. We also note our established rule that any doubt concerning minimum credibility of the witness should be resolved in favor of allowing the jury to hear the testimony and judge the credibility of the witness themselves. State v. Marr, 673 A.2d 452, 453 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam) (citing 1 McCormick On Evidence, § 62 at 91 (4th ed. Strong Prac. Treatise Series 1992)).

…

Custodial Chain of Evidence

The defendant next argues that the trial justice improperly admitted certain physical evidence without showing a continuous chain of custody, and thus the Superior Court erred in permitting Jennifer Finch, a forensic scientist from the Department of Health, to testify that the tests that she performed on pubic hair samples revealed the presence of semen.

A review of the record indicates that on September 24, 1996, speculum samples were taken from Mary's vaginal and rectal areas as part of the "rape-kit" examination administered by Dr. McCue, and samples of pubic hairs were taken from Mary's body and her clothing by Nurse Laura Tetrault. n7 Detective Molloy testified that she observed Nurse Tetrault take the hair and swab samples from Mary's pubic region, and that those samples were forwarded to the Department of Health. Rhode Island State Forensic Scientist Jennifer Finch testified that she received the sexual assault evidence collection kit from Mr. Menard of Women & Infants Hospital. At trial, defendant objected to the results of the tests performed on these samples based on a lack of foundation and insufficient chain of custody. The judge overruled the objections, saying:

"the burden is on the person who contends that there's been some break in the chain of custody from the time a sample is collected until the time it gets analyzed. And, I'm satisfied in this case that the grounds are not well founded."

n7 The state offered to call Nurse Tetrault to testify, but the trial justice refused it as unnecessary.

The defendant now charges reversible error based on this alleged insufficiency in the chain of custody between Nurse Tetrault and the Rhode Island Department of Health.

We again reiterate that "the admission of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion." Hazard, 785 A.2d at 1120 (quoting Graff, 748 A.2d at 252). It is well established that the "showing of continuous chain of custody is relevant only to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility." State v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 151, 154 (R.I. 1988). To admit physical evidence, a party must show only the reasonable probability that no one has tampered with the exhibit. See State v. Reyes, 673 A.2d 454, 457 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam) (citing State v. Bracero, 434 A.2d 286, 290 (R.I. 1981)); Cohen, 538 A.2d at 154. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the state satisfied its burden of establishing a reasonable probability that no one tampered with the evidence. The defendant did not offer any evidence to rebut this showing. Accordingly, the evidence on the chain of custody in this case was sufficient to establish admissibility.

…

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the Superior Court, to which we return the papers in this case.

[Concurring opinion omitted]

[Dissenting opinion omitted]